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Abstract  
Vietnam’s burgeoning market for motorcycles has attracted global industry leaders, 
players from developing countries, and local firms. This has led to a dynamic 
evolution of value chains. This paper presents an explanation of the varieties of the 
growth patterns experienced by the local suppliers, focusing on the roles of customer 
and local supplier strategies. Case studies showed that while the role of customers 
may be important, strategies of suppliers to improve the competitive edge in the 
production of motorcycle components and to diversify into other products account 
for important variations of growth trajectories among local suppliers. Findings 
presented in this paper suggest the need to direct more attention to strategy that local 
firms use to boost their competitive edge in business. 
 
Keywords: local suppliers, motorcycle industry, value chains, Vietnam 
JEL classification: L22, L62, O33 
  
* Associate Senior Research Fellow, Southeast Asian Study Group II, Area Studies 
Center, IDE (fujita@ide.go.jp) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) is a semigovernmental, 
nonpartisan, nonprofit research institute, founded in 1958. The Institute 
merged with the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) on July 1, 1998.  
The Institute conducts basic and comprehensive studies on economic and 
related affairs in all developing countries and regions, including Asia, the 
Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Oceania, and Eastern Europe. 
 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).  Publication does 
not imply endorsement by the Institute of Developing Economies of any of the views 
expressed within. 
 
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (IDE), JETRO 
3-2-2, WAKABA, MIHAMA-KU, CHIBA-SHI 
CHIBA 261-8545, JAPAN 
 
©2008 by Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO 
No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the 
IDE-JETRO. 
1. Introduction 
Motorcycles are a popular means of transportation in developing Asian countries. 
Due to rising demand, motorcycle production in many of these countries has grown rapidly 
in the past few decades (Sato and Ohara eds., 2006). The emerging economy of Vietnam 
has not been an exception. Despite being a latecomer that only started to industrialize 
under its transition to a market economy in the mid-1990’s, the country emerged as the 
world’s fourth largest market in motorcycles in 2006 (following China, India, and 
Indonesia)1. Domestic production of motorcycles started in the late 1990’s with the arrival 
of major Japanese and Taiwanese motorcycle manufacturers serving the tiny domestic 
market. However, the massive inflow of low-priced Chinese motorcycles in 2000 and 2001 
created a heated competition between foreign motorcycle manufacturers and newly 
emerging local Vietnamese firms that assembled Chinese components. This then led to 
boosting consumer demand, rapid expansion of motorcycle production, and investment in 
new product development for the Vietnamese market (Fujita, 2008).  
What does this industrial dynamism mean for the development of local 
Vietnamese firms including local assemblers (which started out by assembling Chinese 
components) and local component manufacturers (which largely cater to the demands of 
the local assemblers but also, to a limited to extent, foreign motorcycle manufacturers)? To 
date, existing research has largely focused on foreign players that have taken the leading 
roles in the industry in the recent years (Ueda, 2003; Mishima, 2007). Local Vietnamese 
assemblers and suppliers have largely been dismissed as non-competitive. However, there 
are indications that intense competition in the domestic market has led to the consolidation 
of local assemblers and suppliers (Fujita, 2006, 2007, 2008; Pham Truong Hoang, 2007).  
This paper explores growth patterns of local firms in the context of these 
industrial dynamics, focusing on local suppliers of motorcycle components. It specifically 
addresses the following question: What patterns of growth can be observed among local 
suppliers, and how can growth trajectories of local firms be explained? At this stage, 
analytical emphasis is placed on extracting the critical components of the growth 
trajectories of local suppliers and highlighting the factors that are likely to affect these 
trajectories.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the 
analytical framework of this paper. Section 3 provides a description of industrial settings at 
the global level and in Vietnam. Sections 4 and 5 comprise the core of the case study. 
Section 4 presents analyses of how value chains in the Vietnamese motorcycle industry 
have been transformed since the end of the 1990’s. Section 5 includes an examination of 
the growth trajectories of six case study suppliers and a discussion of their variations as 
well as explanatory factors behind them. The concluding section contains a summary of 
findings and implications along with a discussion of issues for future research.  
2. Analytical Framework 
The global value chain (GVC) approach (Gereffi, 1999; Schmitz, 2004; Gereffi, 
Humphrey, and Sturgeon, 2005) is at the core of the analytical framework for this research. 
This approach been used to make significant strides in gaining insights into the process of 
                                                  
1 Based on the data from Honda Motor Co., Ltd. (2007). 
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shifting structures of governance of international trade and industrial production as well as 
the sequences of value-adding activities that are functionally integrated and coordinated by 
powerful lead firms from developed countries. Compared to approaches such as the global 
production network approach (Ernst and Kim, 2002), the GVC approach is unique in that it 
emphasizes the “power” that certain actors in chains exert over others. The concept of 
value chain “governance” has been central to the GVC approach because it provides a base 
for looking at the relationships of producers in developing countries vis-à-vis global lead 
firms.  
The GVC approach is used in this research as the basis for constructing a 
framework to explain the growth of local firms. In particular, this research builds on the 
framework presented in a seminal article by Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon (2005). 
These authors propose a typology of value chain governance consisting of market-based 
relationships between firms and vertically integrated firms at the two opposite ends of the 
spectrum of explicit coordination between firms and three types of intermediate modes of 
governance in-between. The types of value chain governance are therefore as follows, in 
the ascending order of the level of explicit coordination: (1) market, (2) modular, (3) 
relational, (4) captive, and (5) hierarchy. The authors argue that the forms of inter-firm 
governance are fundamentally shaped by three factors: (1) complexity of information and 
knowledge transfer required to sustain a particular transaction, (2) the extent to which this 
information and knowledge can be codified, and (3) the capabilities of actual and potential 
suppliers in relation to the requirements of the transaction.  
Since this research is primarily concerned with the growth of local firms, the 
dependent variable is growth trajectories of local suppliers. This variable not only captures 
the absolute level of the growth in a firm at a particular point of time but also growth 
performance over time and sources of growth, such as specific activities and strategies that 
bring about growth performance.  
Figure 1. Relationships between Variables in this Research
(Source) Prepared by the Author. 
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Figure 1 shows the relationship between the variables that explain growth 
trajectories of local suppliers. The key features of this model are: (1) the strategies of 
customers and strategies of local suppliers are treated as two separate variables; and (2) the 
impact of customer strategies on the growth trajectories of local suppliers is mediated by 
the strategies of local suppliers. These are the main differences of the framework adopted 
in this paper from the previous GVC literature, which has focused on value chain 
“governance” as the key determinant of the upgrading of a local firm (Schmitz ed., 2004, 
Schmitz, 2006). Though governance is a useful concept for explaining power constellations 
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in the value chain, it obscures strategic intents and actions taken by individual players in 
the chains and the resulting power dynamics. In particular, the concept tends to divert the 
focus of analysis away from the strategies and actions of suppliers.  
The variable “customer strategies” in this paper is similar to value chain 
governance, which means that “lead firms set and/or enforce terms under which others in 
the chains operate (Schmitz, 2006: 547)”. In value chains governed by Japanese 
motorcycle manufacturers, motorcycle manufacturers are the lead firms and they determine 
which of the value-adding functions are to be done in-house and which are to be 
outsourced to external actors. They also set and enforce the parameters for transactions 
involving what is to be produced (product definition), how it is to be produced, when it is 
to be produced, and how much is to be produced2 (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001: 21-22). 
As with “governance”, this variable is determined by the industrial settings that shape the 
requirements of the transactions. 
The variable “supplier strategies” so far remains relatively under-investigated in 
GVC research. Many researchers acknowledge that buyers do not always upgrading by 
suppliers, and that it requires continuous effort and investment by local suppliers in people, 
organization, and equipment (Schmitz 2004: 356; 2006: 555). However, these concerns are 
limited to upgrading within value chains serving global lead firms. Viewing the business of 
local firms in developing countries holistically, they are commonly engaged in a variety of 
activities. Even those serving global customers often have a diversified customer base 
including local customers, with whom local firms are likely to develop more symmetrical 
relationship than with the global customers3. This suggests that local suppliers have at least 
some room to maneuver with their own growth strategies. This paper directs attention to 
how this important yet largely dismissed factor plays a role in determining the growth 
trajectories of local suppliers both within and beyond the value chains serving global lead 
firms.  
The GVC approach is based on an underlying assumption that serving the global 
market is the key to the growth and upgrading of the local firms in developing countries. 
The industry under investigation largely targets the domestic market of developing 
countries, and this may be seen as incongruent with the GVC approach. However, recent 
research has shown that the essence of the GVC approach can be used to analyze inter-firm 
linkages serving domestic markets of developing countries (Bazan and Navas-Aleman, 
2004; Navas-Aleman, 2006; Tewari, 1999). Indeed, Sturgeon (forthcoming), relative to the 
above-mentioned framework of value chain governance (Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon, 
2005), has argued that “(r)egional, national and local value chains are nested firmly within 
global value chains, as we perceive them, and GVC governance theory operates equally 
well at any and all of these spatial scales”4.  
                                                  
2 The factor of “price” may also be added to the list of parameters set by lead firms (Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 2001). 
3 This is illustrated by the cases of footwear and furniture producers in Brazil (Bazan and 
Navas-Aleman, 2004; Navas-Aleman, 2006) and knitwear producers in India (Tewari, 1999). However, 
these authors did not explicitly examine the role of the strategies of local suppliers in explaining their 
growth and upgrading trajectories. 
4 While Bazan and Navas-Aleman (2004) and Navas-Aleman (2006) emphasize the role of “national” 
value chains in promoting the upgrading (especially the functional upgrading) of local firms, whether or 
not the spatial scale (“national” versus “global”) is the key attribute for explaining upgrading by local 
firms is still controversial.  
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 3. Industrial Settings  
3.1 Global Configuration and the Nature of Technology 
This paper focuses on an industry that produces low-displacement, business-use 
motorcycles. Such motorcycles often serve as an important means of transportation in 
developing countries that are at relatively low stages of development especially 
pre-motorization phases. The motorcycle industry is thus a typical import-substituting 
industry in developing countries.  
A prominent characteristic of the industry is the leading position of Japanese 
motorcycle manufacturers combined with the mature nature of the product5. The basic 
technology for this segment of motorcycles was developed in 1958 when Honda launched 
the highly acclaimed “Supercub” and established an integrated mass production system to 
produce it. There have been few if any radical product innovations since that time. This 
model continues to be used as a base model by many firms (Ohara, 2006a: 26-27). The 
focus of innovation has shifted to incremental process improvements for greater efficiency 
(Abernathy and Utterback, 1978: 44), and the continuous improvement of “quality, costs, 
and delivery” (QCD) has become one of the critical factors for sustaining the competitive 
edge in the industry. By the mid-1980’s, Honda (with Yamaha, Suzuki and Kawasaki who 
had successfully followed suit), expanded operations overseas and captured around 50% of 
the global market6. The leadership of Japanese motorcycle manufacturers was sustained 
primarily by superior QCD performance in the production process of their own as well as 
their component suppliers.  
This highly concentrated market structure has changed over the past decade with 
the rise of local indigenous motorcycle manufacturers in China and India. In particular, the 
newly emerging Chinese motorcycle industry has exhibited organizational features 
strikingly different from the Japanese motorcycle industry discussed above. Chinese 
motorcycle manufacturers have achieved strong price-based competitiveness in the 
production of copies or slightly modified versions of Japanese base models (Ohara 2006a).   
3.2 The Case of Vietnam7 
Vietnam has a short history of motorcycle production. The industry started in the 
mid-1990’s and is characterized by the important role played of FDI and harsh competition 
between players of diverse nationalities. Table 1 provides a list of major foreign 
motorcycle assemblers in Vietnam. The three Japanese firms arrived by the late 1990’s. 
However, massive imports of cheap “knocked-down” components from China (usually 
referred to as “China Shock”) during 2000 and 20018 gave rise to more than 50 local firms 
engaged in the assembly of motorcycles using Chinese components. These “Chinese 
motorcycles” (xe may Trung Quoc) are primarily copies or slightly modified versions of 
Japanese base models. Chinese motorcycles, with what seems to be poor quality, have 
                                                  
5 This paragraph is based primarily on Otahara (2000) and Ohara (2006b). 
6 This figure includes production in Japan as well as exports of vehicles and knocked-down 
components from Japan that are assembled overseas (Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 1986: 4). 
7 This section is based on Fujita (2006, 2007, 2008). 
8 Imports were in the form of “knocked-down” kits rather than assembled vehicles because Vietnam 
had prohibited imports of assembled vehicles since 1998. 
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prices as low as one-third to one-fourth of Japanese-brand models. They have been able to 
penetrate medium- and low-income consumer markets in urban and rural areas, markets 
that had remained unexploited by Japanese and Taiwanese firms. The entry of Chinese 
motorcycles has led to a remarkable market expansion (Figure 2), where local assemblers 
of Chinese motorcycles have accounted for a major share in the years 2001 and 2002 
(Figure 3).  
 
Table 1. The List of Foreign-Invested Motorcycle Manufacturers in Vietnam 
Name of the Company Year ofLicense Ownership Structure
Vietnam Manufacture & Export
Processing Co., Ltd. (VMEP) 1992 Chinfon Group (Taiwan, 100%)
Vietnam Suzuki Corp. 1995 Suzuki Corp. (Japan, 35%)、Sojitz (Japan, 35%), Vikyno: SouthernAgricultural Machinery Corp.(Vietnam, 30%)
Honda Vietnam Co., Ltd. 1996 Honda Motor Co., Ltd. (42%), Asian Honda Motors (Thailand, 28%),Vietnam Engine & Agricultural Machinery Corp. (Vietnam, 30%)
Yamaha Vietnam Co., Ltd. 1998 Yamaha Motors (Japan, 46%)、Hong Leong Industries (Malaysia,24%), Vietnam Forestry Corporation (30%)
Lifan Motorcycle Manufacturing JV Co. 2002 Chonqing Lifan (China）70%, Vietnam Import-Export TechnologyDevelopment Co. (30%)  
(Source) 1) Survey by the author; 2) Survey conducted by Vietnam Institute of Economics, Vietnam 
Academy of Social Science as commissioned by the Institute of Developing Economies in 2004. 
 
The penetration of Chinese motorcycles has created heated competition between 
foreign and local motorcycle manufacturers. In 2002, Honda Vietnam fought back by 
launching a new model that was priced approximately one-third that of its previous models. 
Further, the low quality of “Chinese motorcycles” gradually became evident to the local 
consumers, and the Vietnamese government strengthened the enforcement of import 
controls and local content rules. As the consequence, sales of local assemblers fell 
considerably, and foreign assemblers, especially Honda, quickly expanded their sales 
(Figure 3). Nevertheless, despite the inability to substantially boost their competitive edge 
in terms of quality or design, local assemblers continued to account for the over one-third 
of the market by catering to low-income consumers in rural areas. 
The industry entered a new phase around the year 2005. At this time, the 
Vietnamese government, in an effort to speed up negotiations for the country’s entry into 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), abolished a series of regulations that had previously 
restricted sales of motorcycles and the expansion of production by foreign motorcycle 
manufacturers. This move significantly boosted domestic sales of motorcycles and 
stimulated a new wave of FDI in the expansion of motorcycle production and motorcycle 
component production (Figure 4). This seemed to set the industry on a more 
market-oriented development path. 
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Figure 2. Growth of Vietnam's Motorcycle Market
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Source: Honda Motor Co., Ltd. Sekai Nirinsha Gaikyo (World Motorcycle Facts & Figures), 2007. 
 
Figure 3. Sales of Motorcycles by Manufacturers
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(Source) Bo cong nghiep, “Quy hoach phat trien nganh cong nghiep xe may Viet Nam giai doan 
2006-2015, co xet den nam 2020”, Vien nghien cuu chinh sach, chien luoc cong nghiep, 2007. 
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Figure 4. FDI in Production of Motorcycle
Components (Number of Projects Licensed)
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(Notes) Data for China was available only to October 2004. 
(Source) Prepared by the author and based on data from the Ministry of Planning and Investment. 
rmation of Value Chains: Customer Strategies and the Positions of Local 
Suppliers
 by the value chains governed by three 
relatively
he author with the assemblers and their suppliers in 2001, 
4.1 Japan
 
4. Transfo
 
This section includes discussion of the transformation of value chains in the 
Vietnamese motorcycle industry since the late 1990s. Focus is placed on the changes in 
assembler sourcing strategies and the local supplier positions in these value chains. While 
the industry is characterized by a diversity of nationalities, two sets of value chains that are 
important and have contrasting governance features are examined: (1) those governed by 
Japanese motorcycle manufacturers and (2) those led by local assemblers (typically in 
cooperation with Chinese firms). The former will hereafter be termed “Japanese chains” 
and represented by value chains governed by Honda Vietnam. The latter will be termed 
“Vietnamese-Chinese chains” and represented
 large assemblers (M1, M2, and M3). 
Unless otherwise mentioned, information and data are mainly based on a series 
of interviews conducted by t
2002, 2004, 2005, and 2007. 
ese Chains: Emergence and Consolidation of Honda’s Captive Chains 
As discussed in Section 3, the basic strategy of Japanese motorcycle 
manufacturers for overseas operations was to produce as many components and materials 
as possible in the country where the company had invested. Their value chains in Vietnam 
are best described as “captive”. Suppliers in Vietnam, regardless of nationality, are 
assigned a narrow range of activities in manufacturing components since product 
development and design are conducted in R&D bases in Japan and/or Thailand. 
Components are customized to each model, so customer-specific investments in dies and 
molds are required. Once a supplier for a particular component or a particular model is 
selected, the supplier continues to supply the component throughout the duration of the 
model. Because supplier performance is crucial for Honda’s competitiveness, various 
7 
mechanisms of coordination beyond market transactions (including monitoring, controls 
and assistance schemes) are put in place in order to achieve constant improvements in 
QCD levels. 
riods ranging from several weeks to several months 
in order to set up production system10. 
 
The need for local sourcing has become even more pressing with the 
implementation of local contents rules in the period 2000 to 20019, Honda faced particular 
difficulties in increasing local contents due to the absence of competent local suppliers and 
the reluctance of Japanese component suppliers to invest in Vietnam. At the end of the 
1990s, the local content ratio was only slightly over 50%, and local sourcing was limited 
mainly to in-house production and to the limited number of Japanese suppliers that had 
invested in Vietnam. However, during the start-up phase, Honda Vietnam selected a few 
local companies to be their suppliers. Experts from Japan were sent to the plants of 
potential suppliers to evaluate their operations. After samples were tested and approved, 
experts then stayed at the plants for pe
Figure 5. Local Sourcing of Honda Vietnam
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(Source) Auth
                                                 
or's interviews. 
An important milestone in the evolution of Honda’s sourcing strategy occurred 
in 2002. At that time, the company launched Wave Alpha, a model strategically developed 
to compete against Chinese motorcycles. The price of this model was approximately 
one-third that of the company’s previous models. The key factors behind such radical price 
reduction were squeezing of product development costs by making use of pre-existing 
components rather than developing them from scratch, as well as reduction in the costs of 
 
9 This policy sets out import tariffs for components according to levels of the local content ratio. Higher 
local content ratios mean lower import tariffs. Although the policy was announced at the end of 1998, it 
was not fully implemented until January 2001 due to strong opposition from Vietnamese assemblers. 
10 This description is based on the author’s interviews with local suppliers in 2002 and 2004. Nguyen 
Duc Tiep (2006: 88) also remarks that Honda Vietnam assisted local suppliers in designing production 
layout and process, modifying equipment, and establishing problem solving groups. 
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components. Incumbent suppliers then faced enormous pressure to reduce costs as 
suppliers were compared on the basis of their QCD levels and prices. When Wave Alpha 
was launched, 27 types of components, some of which had previously been sourced from 
Japanese suppliers, were sourced from China through Honda Sundiro Motorcycle Co., Ltd. 
in China. Further, the local content of Wave Alpha and the number of suppliers in Vietnam 
increased substantially during the few years after Honda started to produce Wave Alpha 
(Figure 5). 
tinued to 
be developed in collaborati 11
in cost reduction and eventually achieved higher QCD levels than suppliers in 
China.  
rt in both Vietnamese-Chinese and Japanese 
chains. 
 of captive networks. 
                                                 
  
Honda launched an extensive search for new potential suppliers by dispatching 
experts from Japan. Many non-Japanese firms (especially Taiwanese and Vietnamese 
firms) became Honda’s suppliers at this stage. It is important to note, however, that the 
above changes took place only for non-core components. Honda’s relationship with the 
supplier of core components remained largely unchanged: these components con
on with its “group” suppliers  in Japan and Thailand. 
Although this may seem to be a radical change, the development Wave Alpha did 
not change the basic nature of value chain governance. Instead, it eventually led to an 
expansion and deepening of captive networks in Vietnam. An increase in local content 
ratios after the initial launch of Wave Alpha also entailed gradually replacing Chinese 
components with locally produced components as incumbent suppliers in Vietnam made 
progress 
The development of Wave Alpha, combined with local content rule, also brought 
about an increase in the number of second tier suppliers. This important change came about 
when pressure to substantially reduce production costs led to Japanese and Taiwanese first 
tier suppliers attempting to replace imported components with locally sourced components. 
They further sought to replace components sourced from Japanese suppliers with 
components sourced from Taiwanese or Vietnamese suppliers. The author interviewed six 
suppliers from Japan, Taiwan, and Korea in 2004 and 2005. They used a total of 162 
second tier suppliers, at least 106 of which were Vietnamese firms12. The majority of 
second tier Vietnamese suppliers were small-scale private firms or businesses located near 
the first tier suppliers. Many had previously expanded production of components for local 
assemblers and subsequently began to take pa
Honda’s captive networks experienced further consolidation during the following 
years 2005 through 2007. During this period, Honda’s production scale expanded rapidly 
from roughly 400,000 units per year in 2002-2003 to approximately 1 million units in 
200713. This booming production led to an increase in FDI by Japanese and Taiwanese 
suppliers (Figure 4), including those that had hesitated to invest in Vietnam in the late 
1990’s. The larger scale of orders and intensified competition among suppliers tilted 
bargaining power towards Honda, and this led to further consolidation
 
11 Among Honda’s subsidiaries and affiliates (which have Honda’s capital participation) in Japan, 48 
are producers and distributors of automobile and motorcycle components 
(http://www.honda.co.jp/group/Manufacturing/, accessed on March 4, 2008). Many of these group 
companies have established factories abroad to supply components to Honda’s overseas subsidiaries. 
12 It is possible that some suppliers were counted more than once. 
13 This is an expected figure as of November 2007 (Viet Nam News, November 17, 2007). 
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4.2 The V
respective
 
and to ach
 
exchange
. M1 and M2 
depended
                                                 
ietnamese-Chinese Chains: Evolving Market Relations 
Local assemblers organized value chains in ways strikingly different from 
Japanese assemblers. While there are variations in the strategic orientations of local 
assemblers (Fujita 2006), this paper specifically focuses on the following three assemblers: 
(1) assemblers M1 and M2 which expanded sales by pursuing the “low price” strategy, and 
(2) assembler M3 which pursued a slightly different strategy of “higher price, better 
quality”. Among local assemblers, M1, M2, and M3 ranked first, fourth, and nineteenth, 
ly, in terms of the amount of sales in 200614.   
During the “China Shock”, local assemblers were primarily engaged in the 
assembly of motorcycle component kits imported from China. The sourcing strategies of 
local assemblers emerged in the period 2002 to 2003 when the government stepped up 
enforcement of local content rules and introduced regulations for motorcycle assembling 
firms. These rules required local assemblers to produce certain key components in-house
ieve a minimum local content ratio of 20%15.  
All three assemblers combined in-house production, domestic sources (Chinese, 
Taiwanese and Vietnamese suppliers in Vietnam), and imports (mainly China). Despite 
variations in the combinations across assemblers as well as changes over time, similarities 
in sourcing patterns could be identified. Unlike Japanese assemblers, local assemblers have 
been producing copies or slightly modified versions of Japanese base models, and thus 
components have been mostly general components in the sense that they are not 
customized to specific models. Their value chains are best characterized as market-based. 
While the transactions may not necessarily be “on-the-spot” and may extend over months 
or years, switching of suppliers does take place, predominantly on the basis of price. Since 
assemblers do not demand strict quality and delivery requirements from suppliers,
s of complex information between assemblers and suppliers do not take place.  
While above accounts of sourcing strategies of local assemblers still remain valid, 
the author’s field research in 2007 suggests that market-based chains were gradually 
evolving. Customized components, which are designed for each model that an assembler 
launches, and general components, which are used in common to different models and 
different assemblers, must be distinguished. Plastic covers and engine covers determine the 
external appearance of products. For the three assemblers, these belonged to the category 
of customized components and were designed for each model to meet rapidly changing 
consumer preferences. The remaining components belonged to the category of general 
components. M3 designed and manufactured plastic covers within the firm
 on a Chinese supplier in Vietnam for such covers.  
Perhaps more importantly, the customer-supplier relationship has partially moved 
away from “on-the-spot” market-based transactions. In November 2007, the author 
interviewed a Chinese supplier who supplied plastic covers and frames to 43 local 
assemblers, including M1 and M2. The interview uncovered the fact that this supplier used 
market information and requests provided by customers (local assemblers), and market 
information collected in-house to design approximately four models per year. The 
 
14 Ranks are based on results of the 2006 enterprise survey conducted by the General Statistical Office 
of Vietnam. 
15 Regulations included, among others, minimum investments, the minimum local content ratio, and 
requirements for in-house manufacturing of key components. 
10 
relationship between this Chinese supplier and local assemblers seems to have shifted to 
one characterized by mutual dependence or “relational” governance. This is because the 
knowledge of local assem
 of 
price. By 2005 even M3, which had primarily relied on Taiwanese and local suppliers, 
increasing  turned to Chinese suppliers in Vietnam and direct imports from China16.  
 Chains 
Figure 6. Transformation of 
(1 1990s 
 
 (2) After 2000 
 
(Notes)  J
(Source) Pr
                                                 
blers about the Vietnamese market and the design and 
manufacturing capabilities of the Chinese supplier have become critical for each other. 
However, this shift to relational governance has been only partial. As for non- 
customized components, market-based transactions continued to prevail. Further, the entry 
of an increasing number of Vietnamese, Taiwanese, and Chinese firms into production of 
motorcycle components and the abandonment of local content rules by the Vietnamese 
government have made it easier for local assemblers to switch suppliers on the basis
ly
 
4.3 Summary: Transformation of the Value
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epared by the author. 
 
16 This development is also due to the increase in FDI by Chinese component manufacturers (Figure 4) 
and the reduction of tariff rates for motorcycle components. 
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Analysis in this section has shown how the different nature of products and 
requirements of transactions led Japanese motorcycle manufacturers and local Vietnamese 
assemblers to adopt different sourcing strategies. It has also revealed how competition 
between these two groups of motorcycle manufacturers has brought about adjustments and 
adaptations to their sourcing strategies. These changes in sourcing strategies created new 
opportunities for 
dicates that some suppliers have 
started supplying to both Japanese and local assemblers.  
5. Grow
. This 
uses on local suppliers and the factors underlying their growth patterns.  
5.1 Cases 
pliers of Japanese assemblers also increased during the same period (Fujita 
2006, 2007). 
cial Science in 2004 as commissioned by the Institute of 
Developing Econom
y began to specialize 
in specific products and producti
Vietnamese firms to enter into the production of motorcycle components.  
Figure 6 provides a summary of the transformation of value chains as well as 
changes in positions of local suppliers. The most remarkable changes are two-fold: (1) 
increased numbers and layers of suppliers which suggests consolidation and deepening of 
both Japanese and Vietnamese-Chinese value chains, and (2) emergence of overlap 
between Japanese and Vietnamese-Chinese chains: this in
 
th Patterns of Local Suppliers and Their Determinants 
Steady growth of local component suppliers came with industrial development 
and dynamic transformation of value chains discussed in the previous sections
section foc
Although comprehensive time-series data on local component suppliers are not 
available, the author’s field research in 2004 and 2005 revealed that a number of important 
changes were taking place among local component suppliers. First, from 2000, many local 
firms started supplying components to local assemblers. Second, the number of first and 
second tier sup
 
The growth patterns of six local suppliers from three different categories were 
examined according to the types of value chains suppliers participated in and their 
positions in the value chains: (1) first tier suppliers of Japanese assemblers (Group A), (2) 
second tier suppliers of Japanese assemblers (Group B), and (3) suppliers to local 
assemblers (Group C). Profiles of suppliers are shown in Table 2. Unless otherwise stated, 
data and information are based either on the author’s interviews conducted in 2002, 2004, 
and 2005 or on the questionnaire survey conducted by the Vietnam Institute of Economics, 
Vietnam Academy of So
ies.  
The two suppliers in Group A (A1 and A2) started production of motorcycle 
components in 1998 and 1999, respectively. They became first tier suppliers to Honda 
Vietnam at that time and were among the few local firms selected by that company as 
suppliers during the early years of its operation. Like other state-owned enterprises in 
Vietnam, they were originally engaged in integrated production of a wide variety of 
products in small quantities. After they became Honda’s suppliers, the
on processes designated by Honda.  
Two suppliers in Group B (B1 and B2) are second tier suppliers of Japanese 
assemblers. Both were originally manufacturers of replacement parts. They started 
supplying components for local assemblers around 2000 and subsequently became 
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suppliers to first tier foreign suppliers of Japanese assemblers. Like Group A suppliers, 
they came to specialize in specific production processes: B1 in plating and B2 in 
die-casting. Although data comparable to other cases are not available, both experienced 
rapid expansion of production. Starting out as small household businesses run by a few 
family members, they rapidly expanded sales, made investments, and became limited 
ability companies, each employing a few hundred employees in 2005.  
Table 2. Profile of the Six Local Suppliers 
li
 
A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2
Establishment 1969 1968 1988 1986 1987 1977
Start of Producing
Motorcycle Parts 1998 1999
Replacement Parts:
1988; OEM: 2000 2001
Replacement
Parts: 1990;
OEM: 1999
2002
Sales (billion
VND) 205 66 24 n.a. 58 17
Share of Sales
from Motorcycle
Parts
46% 53%
n.a. (Sales to the
Taiwanese supplier
accounted for 50% of
total sales)
80% 60% 16%
Types of
Motorcycle Parts
(Production
Process)
Metal Stamped Parts
(Stamping)
Sprockets
(Machining)
Plated Parts
(specialized in plating)
Brake Components
(Die-casting)
Cylinder,
Piston Rings,
Valves, etc.
Pistons, etc.
Customers of
Motorcycle Parts
Japanese Motorcycle
Manufacturers and
Component
Suppliers
Japanese Motorcycle
Manufactureres,
VMEP
Taiwanese Suppliers
(second tier to
Japanese assemblers);
Local Assemblers
Japanese Supplier
(second tier to
Japanese
assemblers); VMEP
Local
Assemblers Local Assemblers
Other Products
Stainless Steel
Kitchenware,
Interior Decoration
Items, etc.
Diesel Engines,
Agricultural
Machinery and Parts
Components for
Electronic Products Replacement Parts
Replacement
Parts
Agricultural
Machinery and
Components
First Tier Suppliers of Japanese
Motorcycle Manufacturers
Second Tier Suppliers of Japanese
Motorcycle Manufacturers Suppliers to Local Assemblers
 
(Source)  
1) Survey conducted by Vietnam Institute of Economics, Vietnam Academy of Social Science as 
ews (A1: Aug. 2002, A2: Sep. 2004, B1: July 2005, B2: Aug. 2005, C1: Aug. 
004, C2: Aug. 2005). 
 
commissioned by the Institute of Developing Economies in 2004. 
2) The author’s intervi
2
Local suppliers in Group C (C1 and C2) were originally producers of 
replacement parts and various machinery components. They subsequently began to supply 
motorcycle components to local assemblers around the year 2000. Unlike the suppliers in 
Groups A and B, these suppliers produced wide varieties of components and were engaged 
in various production processes. They expanded their sales until 2002. However, when 
they were interviewed (C1 in 2005 and C2 in 2004), their customers (local assemblers) 
were losing market share, and both suppliers were experiencing declines in sales of 
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motorcycle components. C1 experienced 31% decline in sales between 2002 and 200517. 
he sales growth rate of C2 also decreased from 27% in 2002 to only 10% in 2003. 
5.2 Explaining Gr
ed production 
and market share while local ass
n the chances of local suppliers 
to shift beyond m
assemblers had to depend largely on Chinese suppliers as noted in the previous 
section.  
T
 
owth Trajectories 
There were clear differences in terms of the overall growth performance between 
suppliers in the Japanese chains (Groups A and B) and the group of suppliers that were 
only in the Vietnamese-Chinese chains (Group C). This seems to reflect the overall 
business performance of customers. Japanese manufacturers rapidly expand
emblers stagnated in these areas after 2002. 
Strategies of customers turned out to be important in accounting for differences 
in the acquisition of production management technology aimed at improving QCD levels. 
Suppliers in Japanese chains, regardless of position, were specialized in specific products 
and/or production processes and focused on acquisition of production management 
technology. All suppliers in Groups A and B practiced the “5S” (seiri, seiton, seiso, 
seiketsu, shitsuke) in organizing their shop floor. Levels of the techniques practiced and the 
degree of penetration into the work place differed, but these suppliers introduced quality, 
production cost and delivery control methods, worker management techniques, and/or 
standard operating procedures to ensure levels of QCD required by their customers. At the 
same time, suppliers in Japanese chains were constrained to the narrow function of 
manufacturing according to the detailed drawings and specifications regarding materials, 
production processes, and other requirements of customers. While capabilities of local 
suppliers have only been emerging at this stage, the configuration of Japanese value chains 
discussed in the previous sections seems likely to constrai
anufacturing to design in the long term.  
In contrast, the two suppliers in Group C had not experienced improvements in 
production management technology. Their workshops were not clean or organized, and 
standard production and quality management methods were not adopted. Particularly in the 
case of C1, emphasis was placed on taking on a wider variety of production processes 
in-house rather than improving the production management by concentrating on a 
particular production process. Even though local assemblers urgently needed suppliers with 
competence in designing the components according to changing market demand, such 
competence was not readily available in the pool of local suppliers, and local assemblers 
were not capable of assisting suppliers in developing such competence. This may indeed be 
why local 
While customer strategies are important, they are by no means decisive. 
Important differences in growth patterns were found within each group, and they seem to 
reflect differences in supplier strategies. From the author’s field research, two aspects of 
supplier strategies were found to be particularly important: The first was the proactive 
nature of suppliers relative to changes in the market and business environment. This factor 
proved to be particularly important for suppliers in Japanese chains18. The second factor is 
                                                  
17 This large decline in sales was partly due to the relocation of the factory in order to obtain more 
ess” in 
space for production. 
18 A similar point is made by Nguyen Duc Tiep (2006), who argued for the role of “responsiven
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strategies of product and customer diversification, although at this stage it was not possible 
to identify which strategy was superior to others. Some suppliers were found to concentrate 
in producing motorcycle components, while others actively diversified into related 
industries. F
and undertaken by the state-owned enterprise group that A2 belonged to. To 
the author
roup it belonged to rather than the demand of the market. The company only 
invested in expanding its capacity in 2004, an
urther, suppliers could concentrate exclusively on foreign or local customers, 
or deliberately try to combine both types of customers.   
The two suppliers in Group A exhibited different growth trajectories, and 
differences were related to both how proactive they were to customer demand and to their 
strategies of diversification. A1 expanded its relationship with Honda Vietnam much faster, 
and its diversification into new products and the strengthening of traditional products was 
more active than that of A2. By 2004, A1 had received orders from Honda for increasing 
varieties of pressed steel components. A1 also actively invested in new production capacity 
in response to Honda’s increasing demand. This included construction of two plants 
specifically designed for production of motorcycle components. The company also 
diversified its products and its customer base by supplying interior decoration products for 
a large European buyer. On the other hand, from 1999, A2 supplied only one type of 
component to Honda. A2 continued to produce its traditional products, but despite the fact 
that it was facing the stiff competition of cheaper products imported from China, the 
company did not make an active effort to boost competitiveness of its existing products 
that included components of agricultural machinery and diesel engines. When interviewed 
in 2004, the vice director discussed a decision to invest in the production of transmission 
components for automobiles as a part of a project led and subsidized by the Vietnamese 
government 
’s knowledge, such a project does not seem to have made headway as of the end 
of 2007.   
One factor that seems to explain the different growth patterns of A1 and A2 is 
the difference in how proactive they were in investment strategies. Although both were 
state-owned, A1 adopted proactive investment strategies to actively capture new business 
opportunities in both business with Honda and in the development of new customers and 
products. Granted substantial autonomy by the local government19 to make managerial 
decisions (including investments), the general director of A1 was ready to make 
investments in machinery even before receiving formal orders from Honda20. In contrast, 
A2 was slower and more passive in making investment decisions. As the above example of 
investment in production of automobile components shows, the company’s investment 
decisions were heavily influenced by the policies of the government and the state-owned 
enterprise g
d this was after being pressed by Honda 
Vietnam.  
Divergent growth trajectories were observed within Group B, and these reflected 
active yet different diversification strategies. B1 tried to concentrate exclusively in 
subcontracting relationships with foreign manufacturer by improving the production 
process management technology for plating. The company even employed a part-time 
Japanese advisor in 2005 so that the level of quality controls could be improved. Using its 
                                                                                                                                                       
enhancing the effectiveness of knowledge transfer between Honda Vietnam and its suppliers. 
19 The company was under the supervision of the People’s Committee of Hanoi City. 
20 This statement was made during the author’s interview in August 2002 of the Japanese General 
Director of a joint venture between a Japanese component supplier and A1. 
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experience and its record of supplying motorcycle components to the renowned Japanese 
firms, the company diversified its customer base to Japanese and Taiwanese firms in 
motorcycle and other manufacturing industries. In contrast, B2 emphasized both 
transactions with its Japanese customer and production of its traditional products pf 
replacement parts for motorcycles and bicycles. These were seen as two pillars of the 
company’s business. In the company’s workshop, production management techniques 
designed to sustain QCD levels were practiced only in those lines producing components 
to be supplied to the Japanese customer, not in other lines producing replacement parts and 
components to be supplied to local assem
er of the same group of state-owned enterprises as that of A2, but the bulk of 
s sales has continued to be in machinery components that are sold to other member 
nterprises of the group. Behavior has not changed from what it was before the rise of local 
ssemblers.  
 
ed 
an analysis of the growth traj
blers. More effort was directed to distribution and 
branding of replacement parts rather than improvement of production and process 
technology.  
The difference in the growth performance of Group C was more subtle than that 
of Groups A and B, given that both firms in Group C were facing decreasing orders from 
local assemblers. However, differences in how proactive these companies were in coming 
up with and implementing strategies to diversify their product beyond components to be 
supplied to local assemblers seemed likely to make a difference in the medium term. While 
both of these two companies were stagnating, C1 was more active than C2 in trying to sow 
the seeds for future growth. As sales to local assemblers declined from 2002, C1 made a 
decision to concentrate on its traditional products (replacement parts) and developed a new 
and improved version of one of its major products, valves. To learn the technology and 
acquire equipment necessary to develop the new product, the company sent its engineers to 
visit and observe a partner company’s factory in Taiwan. This was regarded as a cost 
effective way of introducing new technology when limited capital was available for 
investment. While the impact of C1 launching this new product cannot yet be assessed, C2 
took no substantive action to compensate for the loss of sales to local assemblers. C2 was 
and is a memb
it
e
a
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The Vietnamese motorcycle industry has indeed achieved remarkable growth 
since the turn of the century. While local Vietnamese component suppliers have largely 
been dismissed as non-competitive, the rise of local assemblers and the ensuing 
transformation of value chains have opened up new opportunities for the growth of local 
suppliers. This has been done directly by inducing the entry of local firms into 
manufacturing motorcycle components and indirectly by affecting the sourcing strategies 
and value chain structure of Japanese motorcycle manufacturers. This paper has includ
ectories of local Vietnamese motorcycle component suppliers 
amid dynamic transformation of the Japanese and Vietnamese-Chinese value chains in the 
industry, and has also included an explanation of the differences in growth trajectories.  
Despite a limited industrial foundation and a short history, local component 
suppliers have gone through rapid growth and transformation. Preliminary analysis shows 
wide varieties of growth trajectories, both within and beyond the manufacturing of 
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motorcycle components. Among the determinants of local supplier growth patterns, the 
role of customers was found to be powerful, and this is congruent with findings of previous 
GVC research. In the motorcycle industry, Honda has strong product and brand leadership 
as well as thorough knowledge about manufacturing technology. It has been able to 
influence the global configuration of the industry and the nature of technology and 
innovation. It has also been able to draw a clear line between the functions that it 
undertakes by itself and the functions to be outsourced to the different categories of 
suppliers. Even the most competitive group of Japanese suppliers has had no other choice 
but to follo
inding suggests a need to direct attention to the variety of efforts by local 
firms to improve their com
ng point for conducting further empirical investigations 
ith larger samples based on a more refined conceptual framework. Such research may 
indeed uncover the mechanisms that underlie the growth of local firms amid dynamic 
transformations of value chains. 
 
w this. In contrast, local assemblers have been in desperate need of suppliers 
with competence in designing components, but such competence has only been found in 
Chinese suppliers based in Vietnam.  
However, supplier strategies also seem to account for significant variations in 
their growth patterns. It must be emphasized that strategies of suppliers make a difference 
despite the fact that customer control has been very powerful and supplier capability only 
emerging. Though preliminary, this is an important finding in the context of GVC research 
that has consistently emphasized the roles of buyers or customers in governing the value 
chains. This f
petitive edge in overall business rather than only their 
performance in the limited range of functions they undertake in linkages with global 
customers.  
While evidence presented in this paper on the growth of local suppliers is limited, 
findings constitute a good starti
w
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